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DETERMINING THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON
Jonathan Baron†
A recent article in Science warned that the incoming Trump
Administration will try to revise the Social Cost of Carbon (SCC), a metric
that federal agencies use for cost-benefit analysis of a variety of regulations
concerning global warming.1 The current SCC is on the order of $50 per ton.
Trump Administration officials could change two calculation assumptions
to reduce the figure substantially: the discount rate and the geographic
scope. A change in the 2020 discount rate from 2.5 percent to 5 percent
could reduce the 2020 SCC from $62 to $12. A change in the geographic
scope from the world, which is used now, to the United States alone could
have similar if not larger effects. These two changes together could lead to
estimates that would make many current regulations appear to have costs
that exceed their benefits.
In this essay, I take up the question of geographic scope in
determining the SCC—and I will assume, for the sake of analysis, that
monetary cost is the appropriate measure to measure the impact of
emissions, even though money itself has different utility to different
people as a function of their ability to pay for things. I also assess the effect
of the discount rate.2
To begin, it is important to note that the regulation of carbon is done to
prevent harm. It is analogous to the precautions that polluters take to prevent
pollution. Tort law usually holds polluters liable if they are negligent in
taking too little care. The usual test of negligence is that the care taken is
less than optimal. Optimal care means that increases in care up to this point
have greater benefit than cost, and increases beyond this point have greater
cost than benefit. In other words, the benefit per dollar declines as the
amount spent in care increases.
†
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See David Malakoff et. al., Trump Team Targets Changes to Key Metric that Calculates
Social Cost of Carbon, SCI., Dec. 16, 2016, https://www.science.org/content/article/trumpteam-targets-changes-key-metric-calculates-social-cost-carbon.
2
Jonathan Baron, The Discount Rate for the Social Cost of Carbon, REGUL. REV.
(Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.theregreview.org/2017/01/18/baron-discount-rate-socialcost-carbon/.
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One issue in calculating the SCC involves identifying who suffers the
effects of climate change. In fact, the victims are spread around the world.
If we abandon the global scope, we will end up with less regulation, and, as
a result, we will harm more people, both inside and outside the United
States. The money saved by limiting the geographic scope to the United
States presumably will benefit U.S. residents only, so they might be
adequately compensated. But the foreigners will not be. The result of using
the national rather than global scope is that we harm foreigners, by using
the lower level of regulation. Undervaluing the social cost of carbon is, in a
way, an aggression, from the perspective of foreign policy.
From a utilitarian point of view—again, assuming that money is an
adequate replacement for utility—using the global scope is a no-brainer.
Psychologically, however, people may not perceive this sort of harm as
morally wrong. The way individuals think about harm depends on how it is
framed. In a recent paper, I report that people think it is especially wrong to
hurt co-nationals by acts or by omissions, and to hurt foreigners by acts. 3
But psychology scholarship reveals that people find hurting foreigners by
omission is not so bad.4 It is as if we are not responsible for the well-being
of people living abroad in the same way we are responsible for co-nationals.
Thus, if people think of choosing the lower level of regulation—or
lowering the social cost of carbon—as an omission, they will not think it is
so wrong to harm foreigners in this way. They might also think of raising
the level of regulation—or increasing the social cost of carbon—as an action
hurting co-nationals, and hence find it objectionable. Hence, this framing
would pit a “wrong” harmful action against a “not wrong” harmful
omission, and would lead to opposition to the higher level of regulation.
Other psychological framings of the SCC issue pit a wrong action
against a wrong omission. The harm from action would probably dominate.
Although “failing to reduce the level of regulation” could be seen as
harming co-nationals by omission, hence wrong, the alternative option of
“reducing the level of regulation” would be harmful to foreigners, hence
even more wrong because it is an act. Likewise, if people think of “emitting
more carbon” as the act of interest, then this act would harm foreigners, and
thus be considered wrong. The omission of “not emitting more carbon”
would harm co-nationals by raising costs, but this would count as a less
harmful omission. From a practical perspective, framing the situation these
ways would be more conducive to using a global scope for the SCC.
The choice about the geographic scope of SCC can also be understood
as a question of cooperation or defection in a social dilemma. Other nations
are faced with the same choice. It is in each nation’s interest to use its own
national scope in calculating its social cost of carbon, but it is in the overall
interest of the world to use the global scope. And this conclusion takes into
3

Jonathan Baron, Parochialism as a Result of Cognitive Bias, in UNDERSTANDING
SOCIAL ACTION, PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS 203, 218 (Ryan Goodman, Derek Jinks &
Andrew K. Woods eds., 2012).
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account the global cost of regulation as well as the benefit, because the total
cost of the regulation over the world would not exceed the total benefit,
even if every nation used the global SCC.
Again, a psychological factor becomes relevant. Although the analysis
just described does not depend on the number of cooperators, empirical
studies demonstrate that people feel a greater obligation to cooperate when
they believe that a greater number of others will cooperate as well. 5 As a
global power, the United States may have an even greater effect on these
perceptions than most other nations will have. And, in this case, the degree
of cooperation is public for the most part, so we cannot hide any failure to
cooperate very easily.
Because of the likely effect of our cooperation on others, the national
benefit of the United States maintaining a global scope when calculating the
SCC could be quite a bit higher if we take into account the effect of our
behavior on other nations. If we pay X dollars to directly prevent the
emission of Y tons of carbon, the actual reduction would be Y times some
factor, because other nations would be affected by what we do. The
multiplier could be greater than two, depending on which nations are
influenced, and by how much. The influence on other nations’ behavior
occurs regardless of whether we aim for a national or global SCC. Because
of it, the benefit-cost ratio is greater than it would be in the absence of
imitation by others, therefore, increasing the optimal amount of regulation
for the United States.
I doubt that this imitation is effect is considered in any analysis. The
reason it is not considered is that it is very difficult to estimate the multiplier.
When numbers are difficult to estimate, people tend to give up and assume
some default—in this case assuming no impact of imitation, or, in other
words a multiplier of one. But the multiplier is surely higher than that, and
important. Some estimate is surely better than an estimate that practically
insures substantial under-regulation.
In sum, we definitely should not use the national SCC calculated as if
the behavior of others were independent of choices made by U.S.
authorities. From a moral point of view, we should calculate the social cost
of carbon using the global scope. If we choose to think of it this way, use of
the global scope for calculating the SCC ensures that we are not committing
an act of aggression against the rest of the world.
When we perform cost-benefit analysis of regulations, and when the
benefits of those regulations accrue in the future, we discount our estimates
of the benefits so that we can quantify what should be spent today in order
to avoid future damage.6 Regulation of carbon dioxide is a prime example.
It persists in the atmosphere over many decades and causes global warming,
which is itself a slow process with many effects having time lags of decades.
5

Jean-Robert Tyran. Voting When Money and Morals Conflict: An Experimental Test
of Expressive Voting 19 (University of St. Gallen, Discussion Paper 2002-07, 2002).
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Adam Hayes, Discount Rate, INVESTOPEDIA (Aug. 29, 2021), https://www.investopedia.
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4

THE REGULATORY REVIEW IN DEPTH

[Vol. 6:1

The SCC is measured using a discount rate that purports to estimate the
current value of future impacts, thereby allowing regulators to compare today’s
costs more directly to tomorrow’s benefits. The Trump Administration’s
likely increase in the discount rate from 2.5 percent to 5 percent could
reduce the 2020 SCC from $62 to $12 per metric ton of carbon dioxide. 7 A
lower SCC, which suggests a lower value placed on preventing future
damages, would imply that many current regulations appear to have costs
that exceed their benefits.
What is the correct discount rate? I cannot answer that, but I can
comment on the implications of some proposed reasons for discounting that
are suggested by the large literature on this question in economics and
philosophy. Further analysis of the arguments could lead to a more justified
estimate of what the rate should be.
One reason that has been offered for discounting is that people in the
future will be richer than we are now. Because money has “declining
marginal utility,” people in the future, being richer, will value money less
than we do.8 We must spend a larger proportion of our money on
“necessities” that make a big difference in our lives, like food and shelter,
while people in the future will spend more of it on “luxuries” that improve
their well-being only a little. Thus, by discounting, we reduce the SCC and
keep more money for ourselves, which does more good than by giving it to
those who need it less.
But this assumption of increasing wealth could be incorrect. We cannot
assume that the trend of only the last few centuries will always continue,
and we have some reasons to think it will not, due to increasing population,
a reduction in land area for farming, over-fishing, reduced supply of fresh
water, sharply declining biodiversity, and global warming itself, which will
lead to reduced land area for everything, among other problems. 9 The
argument from increasing wealth is thus weak, and the same line of
reasoning could lead to the opposite conclusion if we are more pessimistic
about the future.
Another argument for discounting is that we need to compare
expenditures on some program, such as carbon regulation, to an alternative
in which the money is invested in a way that helps those who would one
day be hurt by climate change. In theory, we could set aside and invest
money today and make sure that the proceeds go to those in need when the
time comes. Or, instead of regulating carbon, we could take other steps to
improve the economic development of poor countries, so that they could
better prepare to deal with the effects of global warming. If the benefits of
such alternative investment accrued over time at the rate of 5 percent, then
regulation without such accrual over time would lose value over time at
7

Malakoff et. al., supra note 1.
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about that rate, by comparison with these alternatives. Using a 5 percent
discount rate for the SCC thus ensures that we do not over-invest in regulation,
relative to these alternatives.
A reply might be, “Why not do both?” In other words, let us regulate
carbon and promote development, even if regulation is less efficient. Should
we focus on one approach only? The argument for discounting answers this
question: Any allocation to a less efficient approach would reduce overall
efficiency.
If we are talking about small changes, then this argument makes sense.
But two additional considerations come into play when we are talking about
large changes in policy, at both the national level and especially the global
level, where, as I have separately argued, U.S. policy can have a substantial
influence on global policy.10
One such consideration is that each dollar of additional expenditure
produces less benefit, the more dollars are already being spent. As
regulation becomes more stringent, it becomes increasingly costly to get the
same additional benefit, so that the benefit per dollar decreases. This effect
is already included in any cost-benefit analysis of regulation, without
discounting. The same may be true of development assistance or
expenditures for research on negative emissions, a term for removing
carbon from the air. In the latter case, the number of researchers who know
how to use additional money is limited. Because of these effects, putting the
eggs in several baskets—that is, regulation, development assistance, and
research—will surely do more good than putting all of them in one basket,
especially given the low probability that even all these approaches together
will be sufficient to avoid serious harm in the future.
A second consideration for large-scale allocation decisions involves
uncertainty about benefits. If we guess wrong about these and put all our
eggs in one basket, we may fail completely, which leads to very bad
outcomes. Thus, diversification of approaches is also justifiable as insurance
against being completely wrong. It is more likely that something will work,
if we try many things. Moreover, it does seem that carbon regulation is more
certain to have future benefits than either of the other approaches.
In sum, although the benefits of potential alternatives should be
considered in the overall decision about allocating resources for dealing with
climate change, it would be better to do this explicitly rather than through a
discount rate based on questionable assumptions about alternatives. And
allocation of additional resources to regulation does not necessarily imply
that resources devoted to other approaches need to be reduced.
Another argument for discounting is “pure time preference,” the simple
fact that people care less about the future than the present. 11 We do this
within our own lives, and it is difficult to say that it is irrational. Why should
I care as much about my future self as about my present self? If I think of
10

Baron, supra note 2.
See Philip A. Trostel & Grant A. Taylor, A Theory of Time Preference, 39 ECON.
INQUIRY 379 (2001).
11
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my future self as another person, then my lack of concern for him could be
part of a lack of concern for other people in general, as opposed to my
present self. I thus may want to discount the future of humanity because I
discount other people more generally. This kind of discounting, too, may
not be clearly irrational.
However, when we discuss regulatory policy, we are taking a societal
perspective, in which I am just one of many billions who are affected. From
this perspective, a preference for present people over future people becomes
a form of moral prejudice, such as caring more about white people than
black people. The same issue arises if we care more about co-nationals than
about foreigners.12 From a moral and societal point of view, such preferences
for unequal treatment are difficult to justify. If we end up doing so because
our self-serving preferences express themselves in the behavior of citizens
in a democracy, that is not a justification so much as an unpleasant fact.
We do have some good reasons for discounting at the level of policy.
Uncertainty about future events gives us such a reason. There could be some
technological advance that would solve the problem and make any present
sacrifice fruitless. The Times of London, in 1894, predicted that New York
City would be buried under nine feet of horse manure within about 50
years.13 By 1912, most horses had been retired. Or, humanity could be
largely or completely wiped out by a nuclear war, an epidemic, or an
asteroid. In this case, too, any sacrifice now would be for naught.
Even though uncertainty about future events does permit some
discounting, it is difficult to say how much this should be. But it is surely at
the low end of the range now being considered. It is hard to imagine what
technological advance might quickly alleviate the problem. Even totally
carbon-free energy generation would not do it, because of the carbon that is
already in the air. And the chance of a civilization-destroying war or
epidemic, while difficult to estimate, may also be low.
The sort of discounting justified by uncertainty, small as it may be, also
serves to avoid another problem with zero discounting. If we do no
discounting at all, we would need to consider irreversible effects of our
actions now that would persist forever, such as loss of biodiversity.
Biodiversity may or may not have much utility for humans now. But if we
consider the fact that its loss is forever, and if we do not discount the future,
then we should be putting all of our resources into the protection of
biodiversity. This is not a problem we need to worry about, so long as we
do some discounting.
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Baron, supra note 3, at 203; Baron, supra note 2.
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